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COMMENT: COPYWRONGS WILL NOT
MAKE COPYRIGHT
Mark Avsect
I want to thank Professor Nard for inviting me. This is a little
new for me. I am not as used to participating in these debates as
my colleagues on the panel are, but I am nevertheless proud to be a
part of this panel. What I am going to try to do, in the hope that I
add something to the discussion, is to offer some commentary
from somebody who actually made a living as a songwriter, pro-
ducer, and artist before he became a lawyer.
I acknowledge that Internet radio is a mess. This past week I
was working on a deal for a company that has an Internet radio-
type business model. Aside from the fact that advertising-based
business models, such as Internet radio, are currently having a hard
time, Internet radio-type businesses are also challenged by the
complexity of copyright law. The complexity of copyright licens-
ing and, in particular, the layers of copyright proprietors are barri-
ers to moving forward. In some ways, perhaps Professor Lange,
whose comments I enjoyed very much, has the right idea: perhaps
we should do away with copyright law.' However, at the end of
the day, I ultimately disagree with Professor Lange, for I am a
copyright optimist.
Although I am a copyright optimist, I would like to think that
I am open to new paradigms. I was telling Professor Loren over
dinner last night that I tried to keep an open mind while reading
her paper. I tried to be open to her ideas. Today I listened to Pro-
fessor Lange discuss Grateful Dead concerts and how the Grateful
Dead encouraged the copying of their concerts. 2 Thus, one real-
izes that the world does not have to be as it is, a world with copy-
right law. We can live in a different world. Copyright laws are
person-made laws. I would add, however, that with respect to the
t Attorney, Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff LLP, Cleveland, Ohio. Before be-
coming a lawyer, Mr. Avsec earned a living as a studio musician, producer, and songwriter,
writing over 300 songs and producing more than 25 sound recordings for various artists. He is
an American Music Award winner and has been nominated for two Grammy Awards.
David Lange, A Comment on New York Times v. Tasini, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 653
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Grateful Dead, they wrote their own material. Therefore, if the
Grateful Dead encouraged people to tape their concerts and dis-
tribute the tapes, you did not have third party composers who were
not getting compensated. With respect to the theory that copyright
owners do not need the incentive of a copyright monopoly to pro-
duce because bands such as the Grateful Dead benefit from more
frequent personal appearances and opportunities to sell merchan-
dise, such a theory does not work for a "pure" songwriter who
chooses to make a living composing works for others. That song-
writer does not get the benefit of enhanced concert fees or en-
hanced merchandising revenue if he or she does not get mechani-
cal royalties or public performance fees. And, for the most part,
there was essentially only one musical composition performed at
each Grateful Dead concert anyway.
I have now been a lawyer for about seven years. Before I be-
came a lawyer I made a living as a songwriter, a producer, and a
recording artist. As stated earlier, I was with Wild Cherry. I also
wrote and produced songs and recordings for Donnie Iris, and I
wrote a song for Bon Jovi as well. I am an example of somebody
who was able to derive a middle class existence from writing and
recording music on a full-time basis. Still, because of an experi-
ence I had, and in an effort to earn more money for a growing fam-
ily, I was driven to the law. I would warn all of the lawyers here
not to tinker too much with copyright law. If you succeed in wa-
tering it down or eradicating it entirely, we are going to have thou-
sands of more lawyers in the world because neither musicians nor
artists are terribly good at science. I think that if you force them to
go into other occupations that they are definitely headed for the
law. And pretty soon, we will have a world full of lawyers and
nothing to talk about.
About a week ago, I read Professor Loren's very thoughtful
article.3 I also read some of the underlying commentary that she
referenced in her article. In truth, Professor Loren's approach is
quite positive. She is not out to do away with copyright. I think
that she has tried to come up with some sort of solution that works
for everybody. And here we are, ready to burst the balloons that
she has floated.
I came to the law because I was sued for copyright infringe-
ment. It was a frivolous case. I co-wrote a song for Donnie Iris
called "Ah! Leah!" and it became a bit of a hit record. It was the
first time I was going to make some real money. I was the sole
3 Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 673 (2003).
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support for a family of four, and I essentially made a living writing
songs and playing shows. So, not unlike Mr. Tasini or the other
plaintiffs in New York Times Co. v. Tasini,4 I was a middle class
person who made a living off of the copyright law's monopoly.
Then I received a Summons and Complaint that I was being sued
because I had allegedly stole someone else's song. Although I
won the lawsuit, it cost over $100,000 to litigate the case. Even
though I had contribution from the publisher and from Donnie Iris,
the experience changed my life. Initially, the experience left me
quite down on the law. I felt completely raped by the whole proc-
ess because I knew that I did not do anything wrong. Eventually,
though, I found my way to law school because it was cheaper than
therapy, although not by much.
I was sitting in my copyright class, having experienced what I
experienced, and my copyright professor, who I suspect would
completely agree with Professor Lange's point of view, lectured
that copyright is an evil monopoly, that we should not have it, and
that creators will be sufficiently compensated in other ways, such
as by being the first to market, etc. I was almost jumping out of
my seat. "You lawyers are charging me $100,000, and then you
are going to tell me that it is bad for society if I earn eight cents a
copy!" It still makes me jump out of my seat.
The purpose of copyright law, as set forth in all of the cases
that we have discussed today, and as set forth in the United States
Constitution, is to act as an incentive for authors to produce. It is a
monopoly, and monopolies are inherently evil. However, the
thinking goes that society is better off with copyright's evil mo-
nopoly, provided that it is for a limited time. Copyright's monop-
oly should not last any longer than is necessary to incent authors to
produce. We do not have copyright because it is "fair." We want
access to author's works. We want the works as cheaply as we can
get them. Is that not the party line? Having said that, I am not
sure if deep down inside everyone in this room believes that. I
have heard the word "fair" more than once today. I think that we
heard the word "fair" here today because, although copyright may
have the effect of offering an incentive to creators to produce,
copyright is also about what kind of world we want to live in.
Last Sunday I was re-reading Professor Ray Ku's article,
which Professor Loren had cited in her paper, as well as other
well-known papers by those who suggest that we should do away
with copyright law. 5 I read an excerpt from the British historian,
4 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
Loren, supra note 3.
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McCawley, who called copyright an "author's tax." Professor Ray
Ku stated that the people who were using Napster were not the
thieves; the authors themselves were the thieves! Suddenly, I
started feeling very badly. I mean, who are these authors? Where
are they, these thieves? We should find them, root them out, and
lock them up. Only we would not treat them as garden variety
thieves. No, we want access to what they have. We would come
home after a hard day of lawyering, I presume. The authors would
have been in their little cages all day, writing and producing, and
we would demand, "Okay, what do you have for us today?
'Moonlight Sonata.' Okay, good." (Moves to the next author.)
"What do you have for us today? 'Jeremiah Was a Bullfrog?'
What is this drivel? No soup for you!" And if one author pro-
duces because he is in love with a woman or because he wants to
be famous, we would not need to give that author money as an in-
centive. Hyperbole aside, is that the kind of world we want?
Moreover, the incentive of copyright purportedly exists in or-
der to promote the "progress" of the arts and sciences. However,
if it is supposed to be about "progress," read the "Billboard Top
Ten." I have actually brought a copy, although I will not bother to
read it. I do not think that copyright law is necessarily about "pro-
gress." Again, I think that it is about what kind of world that we
want to live in. In fact, I think that some of the greatest music be-
ing written today is not supported by the market and, therefore, is
not supported by copyright's monopoly. We have to figure out
other ways of compensating composers of classical and jazz music.
We need those people and organizations who patronize the arts
where copyright's monopoly fails to support them, so that we truly
do have new ideas, i.e., so that we truly do have progress. Other-
wise, we will only have the dumb-downed, homogenized culture
that copyright law supports. No, I do not think that we necessarily
have copyright to promote progress.
Professor Loren has suggested that we abolish the compulsory
mechanical license.6 At first blush, this sounds like it would not
be a bad thing. If something is not compulsory, I do not have to
do it. It sounds like it gives artists more freedom.
The initial goal of the compulsory license, as Professor Loren
pointed out in her paper, was to prevent a monopoly of a piano roll
company in the early twentieth century from cornering the market
on certain piano rolls. 7 Today, the compulsory mechanical license
6 Id.
7 Id.
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effectively prevents any record company from having a monopoly
respecting a particular musical composition, as I will explain.
If the compulsory license is abolished, it may mean that a
publishing company that is affiliated with a major label would be
able to corner the market on a particular song. For example, you
might imagine that one record label would have the right to record
and issue all sound recordings of "New York, New York" or "Yes-
terday." There are thousands of recordings of these songs on many
different labels. If you abolish the compulsory license, there might
only be one recording. I am not afraid of that happening, and I do
not even know if that would be a bad thing, but I raise the issue
nonetheless.
Another problem with abolishing the compulsory license is
that it may be the end of the Muzak business model. There will
likely be no more Muzak without the compulsory license, because
I submit to you, facetiously, that Muzak exists solely because there
is the compulsory license.
What kind of progress has occurred because we have the
compulsory license? The compulsory license arguably has en-
couraged cover recordings of musical compositions. What has
been the effect of that? How many cover recordings of composi-
tions are actually better than the original recordings of those com-
positions? I can think of two: "You Keep Me Hanging On" by
The Vanilla Fudge, arguably better than the Supremes' original
version; and "With A Little Help From My Friends" by Joe
Cocker, arguably better than the Beatles' original version. There
are a few more, but not many.
With respect to the statutory rate associated with the compul-
sory license, eighty cents is a really cheap price for a record com-
pany to pay for all that content. When you consider that the sug-
gested retail list price of a CD is $15.98 or more, a record com-
pany can, for eighty cents, license all of the underlying content.
Thus, without the compulsory license cap, a proprietor of a musi-
cal composition can perhaps do better. Therefore, maybe it is a
good thing to abolish the compulsory license.
However, when you combine Professor Loren's multiple sug-
gestions that (1) the compulsory license be abolished, (2) the vari-
ous section 106 divisible rights be collapsed into one unified right
to "commercially exploit the expression," and (3) derivative work
independence 8 be employed, I believe that musical composition
writers will be much worse off.9 I tend to think that writers of mu-
8 In 1990 this doctrine was rejected in Stewart v. Abend, 465 U.S. 207.
9 Loren, supra note 3.
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sical works will not make good bargains when they are negotiat-
ing. I think that in many cases they will receive $2,000 and just
give away their rights. Many songwriters and artists are desperate
to get recording contracts. Thus, they are vulnerable to overreach-
ing deals. However, something close to the statutory rate has at
least been sacrosanct. The rate has historically not been adjusted
below a three-quarter rate, which is fairly standard. So, at least if
an artist/writer doe snot receive a good deal as a recording artist,
he or she will still receive a fairly standard rate for the songs that
he or she writes for the albums, plus performance rights and syn-
chronization fees, if applicable. The three-quarter mechanical rate,
in a weird sort of way, acts as a floor. In addition, the writer con-
tinues to receive other income streams associated with the tangled
web of rights he or she owns: public performance monies for per-
formances on the radio or through the Internet; monies derived
from selling sheet music; and synchronization fees derived from
commercials, television shows, and films. In Professor Loren's
world, writers of underlying musical compositions will not nearly
fare as well.
In Professor Loren's world of derivative work independence,
the abolishment of the compulsory license, and the collapse of the
divisible section 106 rights into one unified right to "commercially
exploit the expression," the record companies will obtain all of the
rights they need to "commercially exploit the expression" of a
song immediately, i.e., a buy-out: they will get mechanical rights,
public performance rights, and synchronization rights; they will
get to take that derivative work, the sound recording, and use it in
a commercial later on, and they will obtain the right to do so at the
outset. Perhaps the song ultimately will be a huge hit. "Play That
Funky Music, White Boy" was used in an Intel spot on Super Bowl
Sunday about three or four years ago, and the synchronization fee
for that was enormous. You cannot predict what a negotiated rate
will be years after the fact. There is no way a writer is going to get
that kind of money up front before a song is proven.
However, my most important criticism of Professor Loren's
thesis has to do with respect to a writer's right to terminate a trans-
fer. Professor Loren's suggestions in her paper will effectively
eviscerate the termination of transfer right for authors.
The copyright law provides for a right to terminate a transfer
and recover a copyright.'0 For copyrights transferred on or after
January 1, 1978, the author may terminate any transfer thirty-five
10 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304 (1988).
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years after the date of the transfer." The Congressional intent in
granting this right for an author to terminate a transfer of copyright
was to give an author, including a songwriter, a chance to recap-
ture a copyright, in this case a musical composition, and enjoy the
rewards of the creative work at a time in the future when he or she
is in a better position to assess the musical composition's value.'
2
Termination gives authors a "second bite of the apple" and pro-
tects him or her from transfers for which he or she was inade-
quately compensated because it is quite often not possible to prop-
erly evaluate a creative work's true value until it has been ex-
ploited.'
3
For example, when I am older, I look forward to taking back
most of my copyrights from the publisher to whom I initially trans-
ferred them. Once I do that, either my own publishing company
will then earn those public performance royalties and mechanical
royalties, or I can make a brand new deal with a Warner Chappel
or an EMI, one of the 800 pound gorilla publishing companies, for
a substantial advance, and one of those companies can co-publish
my musical compositions with my publishing company. When I
terminate transfers, my income from my older musical composi-
tions, if they are still being exploited, will exponentially grow, and
I will earn an advance upon consummating new publishing deals
respecting new transfers of those older musical compositions at a
time when I am better able to assess the value of those copyrights.
The initial publishing company to whom I made the initial trans-
fers will have had the opportunity to earn money from those copy-
rights for the first thirty-five years. However, in my golden years,
my family and I will have the opportunity to earn more money, as I
should from those copyrights, at a time when I need the money the
most. What is more important is that, if the initial transfers were
improvident, I will get a "second bite of the apple."
Professor Loren's multiple suggestions of derivative work in-
dependence, the abolishment of the compulsory license, and the
collapse of the divisible section 106 rights into one unified right to
"commercially exploit the expression" will destroy my second
chance. As I said, under the present scheme, when I terminate the
transfer to an initial publisher of a copyright, my publishing com-
pany in 2015, or a new publishing company that I make a deal with
in 2015, will then receive all of the royalties (mechanical, public
11 Id. § 203.
12 See, e.g., Marc Stein, Termination of Transfers and Licenses under the New Copyright
Act: Thorny Problems for the Copyright Bar, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1141 (1977).
13 Id.
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performance, and synchronization) derived from a hit sound re-
cording that incorporated that musical composition in 1980. The
record company or its successor in 2015 would still have to pay for
that underlying content, but the payee would change (no longer the
old publishing company, now my new publishing company). My
composition in 2015, thirty-five years after the initial transfer to
the initial publisher in 1980, will still be recognized as an inde-
pendent underlying work, with an economic potential for future
exploitation vis-a-vis reproductions, the creation of other deriva-
tive works, and public performances. 14
I cannot terminate the transfer my initial publishing company
made to the initial record company, i.e., the initial permission to
make the derivative work, that 1980 sound recording. Under the
Copyright Law, there is a derivative work exception that protects
the owners of derivative works, such as sound recordings, from
having to renegotiate rights in the underlying works, such as musi-
cal compositions, when an author terminates rights to the underly-
ing works.' 5 The 1980 sound recording continues to be sold and
publicly performed. However, once I terminate the rights to the
old publisher of the underlying music composition, without con-
sidering the effects of Professor Loren's suggestions, the record
company has to recognize me or my designee as the musical com-
position's new proprietor and must pay me or my designee me-
chanical royalties to continue to exploit it beyond 2015. I, or more
particularly, my publishing company designee, will likely also re-
ceive additional public performance fees from ASCAP, BMI, or
SESAC, as the case may be. This was exactly Congress's intent.
The termination of transfer permits me to enjoy the fruits of that
hit record thirty-five years later, admittedly not during the hit re-
cord's peak period, but nevertheless at a time when I can still par-
ticipate in a steady stream of income derived from repackaging,
etc. I stand in the shoes of the original publishing company to
whom I initially transferred that musical composition.
If Professor Loren's multiple suggestions of (1) derivative
work independence, (2) the abolishment of the compulsory license,
and (3) the collapse of the divisible section 106 rights into one uni-
fied right to "commercially exploit the expression" are employed, I
would still be able to terminate my improvident 1980 transfer to
the initial publisher in 2015. However, the only hit recording that
will likely ever exist in which that musical composition is embod-
14 The copyright owner controls a bundle of rights that are divisible into different types of
uses. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
15 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(b)(1), 304(c)(6)(a).
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ied will not yield any money for me at a time when I may need it
the most. This is because (remember) the record company back in
1980 may have bought up all of my rights to that musical composi-
tion for a $2,000 flat fee, with no future obligation to pay me-
chanical royalties, synchronization royalties, or anything else.
Understand, because the record company's recording of the
musical composition is a derivative work, that marriage of song
and sound recording cannot be undone, and I am not suggesting
that it should. Indeed, the Copyright Act provides a derivative
works exception to the termination of transfer right. I am only
suggesting that thirty-five years later the record company, and any
other exploiter of that underlying musical composition, including,
without limitation, a terrestrial radio station or a digital music ser-
vice such as a celestial jukebox, ought to have an obligation to
continue to pay consideration to the copyright proprietor of that
musical composition for the continuing right to exploit it. Other-
wise, the right to terminate a transfer is to a great extent illusory
and meaningless, contravening Congress's clear intent. If Profes-
sor's Loren's suggestions are employed, something that is most
important to authors is inadvertently contravened.
I acknowledge that challenges face the recording industry and
the music publishing industry in the years ahead. Admittedly,
technology has again forced us to rethink copyright law. But new
technology, including Gutenberg's printing press, has always
forced society to do that periodically. The Internet and digital
technology have forever changed the entertainment business, that
is for sure. New business models must emerge as a result. How-
ever, at the end of the day, copyright will survive. My small point
here today is that copywrongs will not make copyright. If this
seminar has taught us anything it is that we must be very careful
untangling the web of copyright, for when we pick up one end of
the stick, we pick up the other. It is a tangled web indeed.
2003]

